Why Electronic Voting Is Still A Bad Idea

Five years ago, I made a video for a channel
called Computerphile about why electronic voting is a bad idea. And I still get emails, occasionally, asking: things must have changed by now, right? There’s this new idea,
and maybe it’ll help. Surely electronic voting is
just around the corner? No. No, it’s really not. Here is why electronic voting
is still a bad idea. Elections have some very unusual requirements. There are two key features that are almost
opposed to each other: anonymity and trust. So first, your vote should be completely anonymous. There should be no way that anyone
can find out who you voted for, even after everything’s been counted. That way, no-one can bribe you or
threaten you to vote a particular way. In the UK, if you mark your ballot in a way
that could potentially identify you, so if you sign it, for example, then
that ballot is not counted. This is why election officials are
worried about people taking selfies with their completed ballots: because you should not be able to
prove how you voted afterwards. Otherwise, you can have attacks like
“$10 off for blue voters!” or “Entry to this party
only for yellow voters!” or “vote red or you’ll regret it.” Votes have to be anonymous. The second requirement is
absolute, transparent trust. The system needs to make sure that your vote
is securely and accurately counted, sure. But it also needs to be obvious to everyone,
no matter their technical knowledge, that the system can be trusted. So if you’re using paper, you place your
ballot in a sealed box that doesn’t get unsealed until
everyone with a stake in the election has someone representing them
in the room. There should always be people from more than
one side guarding it, or at the very least, witnessing that there’s a tamper-proof seal
being used for transport. Voters need to be able to trust that their
vote will be counted even though they’ll never see it again and
it can’t be traced back to them. And at no point is a single person put in
a position of trust. People can be corrupt, or threatened, or
incompetent, or all three at the same time. Now, physical voting is not perfect. It can be attacked, it has been attacked. The UK’s own paper system doesn’t fulfil
both of those requirements perfectly, it is possible to identify voters from their
ballots if a court orders it, and there are stories about that being done
outside the law too. But the key point is not that paper voting
is perfect: it isn’t. But attacks against it don’t scale well. Physical voting is centuries old. And in that time almost every conceivable
fraud on the system has been tried, and defences have been found. The more physical votes you need to change, the more people you need to influence, the more time and money it takes, and the less likely it is that your
little conspiracy will stay secret. In a UK election, there are hundreds of polling
stations across the country, with staff made up of scores of employees
and thousands of volunteers. The job of changing a
significant number of votes, enough to sway an election,
becomes very, very difficult. People have attempted it,
some people have been convicted, a few have probably gotten away with it
on some scale. “Granny farming” is the term that
shady operatives use for going round all the retirement homes and getting vulnerable elderly people to sign
a proxy vote, a paper saying that someone else can vote
on their behalf. And yeah, on a small scale,
that has worked. But once you start scaling up that attack it becomes extremely difficult and time-consuming and the chances are you’re going to get
found out. With electronic voting, that’s not the case. So first, let’s talk about
electronic voting machines. That’s where there’s a computer at the
polling station: so voters still go into a booth, it’s just that they are pushing buttons,
or tapping things on a touchscreen, not writing on paper. Problem number one:
trusting the software and the hardware. In theory, our voting computer could be running
open source software where anyone can see and
check the source code. In practice, that doesn’t happen: it’s probably going to be closed source, it’s probably going to be loaded off
an easily-compromised USB stick, on a computer that’s been sitting unguarded and sometimes just idly and inexplicably connected
to the internet for years. And those systems only ever get a full-scale
test when an election actually takes place. That in itself should be enough to stop
electronic voting ever being a thing. But, okay, let’s say that we do, magically, have the most stable, secure,
open source software possible. How does a voter know and trust that the correct
software is actually installed on the machine they’re using? Maybe we could use some sort of checksum or
some other system to make sure the voting
is running correctly. But then you’re just moving the problem, now you have to trust that checksum hasn’t
been forged. And almost no voters actually will understand
what that check even means, or why they should trust it. In the United States, voting machines are
regularly tested every year… at the Voting Village at DEFCON, one of the
world’s largest hacker conventions. It’s not an official thing. Hackers there have managed to alter the stored
vote tallies, change the ballots displayed to voters,
and in one case, have got a machine to run
the video game Doom. Imagine if, instead of a machine, there was
just a person in the voting booth, and you had to whisper your vote to them,
and they promised, oh, yes, you can absolutely trust them to
accurately record your vote and pass it on to the people
who are doing the count. No, you can’t see how or where they’re
writing it down, you can’t actually call and find out where they are or what they’re doing, but they absolutely promise. That’s basically what’s happening with
an electronic voting machine. You just have something that says:
trust me. I’ve counted your vote and I have absolutely
not been compromised. Honest. Problem number two is votes in transit. How do you get the votes off that machine
to the central counting place? There are three possible ways. One, you could take all the voting machines
to the count. You could seal them all up,
and transport them physically from where the voting took place
to where the counting takes place. No one does that. So, you could download all the results from
each machine onto a USB stick and take that. One bit of sleight-of-hand and you’ve got
a completely different set of results. If you’re about to propose some system where
the results are checksummed and trusted: please explain that to the average voter in
a way they can understand and implicitly trust. Okay, so, maybe we could transmit the votes
electronically over the internet. Which is… optimistic. Man-in-the-middle attacks
are more difficult now, but they’re not impossible, particularly if you can’t trust
the software on either end. And now you’re connecting the voting machines
directly to the internet. Deliberately. Which brings us to problem number three:
the central counting server. Right at the end of the process
there is the server that tallies the votes and gives the
final count. Which has all the same problems
with trust and verification as the individual voting machines, but now only a few people can
even see that computer. That’s also true about
electronic counting machines: ones that take stacks of paper ballots
and return totals. How do you trust they aren’t quietly changing
some votes? We live in a world where Volkswagen
got away with specifically designing their cars to cheat
on emissions tests for years. And that’s before we include user error. In one Scottish election,
trialing electronic voting, a result was corrected after one observer
noticed it didn’t make sense, and stopped the announcement at the last minute. Turns out that someone forgot to scroll
all the way to the right to read the columns on an
Excel spreadsheet with the results in. And even if you can’t compromise the election,
you can still break trust. You can still cast doubt on a voting
machine, or the entire counting system, just by leaving an unknown USB drive in it,
taking a picture, and posting it online. Or just faking a photo of that. To break an electronic election,
you don’t actually need to break it: you just need to cast enough
doubt on the result. It is a lot more difficult to do that with
paper and physical ballot boxes. And all this is before we get to
the really terrible idea: that people should be able to use their phone
or computer to vote from home. Now, I’m sure the device that you, personally, are watching this on is malware-free and up-to-date.
Of course it is. But can you trust that for everyone
in your family? For everyone on your street? The exact numbers differ depending on
which security firm’s figures you go with, but it’s safe to say that a huge number of computers are infected
with some sort of malware. Huge numbers of phones are on old, vulnerable
versions of their operating systems. And that’s just scammers setting up botnets
and minor extortions. Imagine the sort of attack that
could be put together by a small, well-funded team backed
by a national government. That sort of attack would scale
very, very well. Find the one hole in the system, and suddenly it costs roughly the same to change one vote
as it does to alter millions: and your conspiracy stays
very, very small indeed. Maybe you don’t even have to set foot in
the country whose elections you’re hacking. Now, there are a couple of regular objections
I get to this. First of all: what about Estonia? Yes, in 2005 Estonia became the first country
in the world to offer internet voting, first in local elections,
then in national, then in European. In 2019, more than 40% of votes
were cast online there, which is just short of a quarter of a million people. On the surface, the system seems robust. Voters can ID via their government-provided
smart card, or the SIM card in their phone. But there are problems. An independent report found gaps in the procedural
and operational security. The architecture of the system is a decade
old and it’s now dangerously out-of-date, and it’s open to cyberattacks
by foreign powers either by exploiting individual phones or by breaking the trust in the
server that counts the votes. The other common objection is: what about
new technologies? What about blockchain? Look, leaving aside trying to
explain blockchain to people and asking them to trust this
weird technology is worth using, it’s basically just a write-only database. It doesn’t solve the problem of trusting
the software or hardware: it doesn’t change how
the voting machine works, the interface between the voter’s intention and what’s actually written to
the database still has to work. If it prints a receipt of the vote you can
check later, it breaks anonymity. If it prints a receipt of seemingly-random
numbers you can check later, it breaks trust, because hardly anyone will understand what’s
actually going on there. I’m not saying there aren’t advantages
to electronic voting. Yeah, there are. Accessibility is the main one, and that’s
really important. In low-stakes elections, for small groups,
for the little things, sure, go for it. But when the future of nations
rests on the result: electronic voting is still a bad idea, and you should still vote against it. While you can. I’m endorsing Dashlane for two reasons:
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Comments 100

  • It's already been two days since this video was posted. Is it still a bad idea now?

  • If you want to do something high-tech and redundantly to solve voting forever: every voter gets a random physical coin at the polls with an embedded, unique, random RFID that only the registrar can generate with their private key. The voter places their coin into the slot leading to a container for their candidate and they get a paper receipt of their vote with the coin they just used.

    Larger and larger containers can then aggregate votes coins. And every container is weighed to count votes AND scanned to verify the votes it contains them with an RFID scanning system embedded in every container.

    To verify your vote was counted, all containers scanners record their RFID contents of every vote each container has (it doesn't who voted for who), and the tracking system finds your vote by you typing in the magic number on your anonymous receipt to prove it was counted.

    Coupled with chain-of-custody and third-party auditing and monitoring, this is the most foolproof way we can do voting… by neither trusting evoting nor physical voting alone.

    – RFID
    – paper-trail
    – physical object that can be weighed
    – no hanging chads BS

  • You're making a bunch of strawman arguments that are disingenuous. "Decent" Evoting machines would never, ever be connected to the internet. They would use a private network of leased lines. But not stop there, they would be each issued registrar-baked-in digital certificates to establish an encrypted, authenticated and authorized connection to upload vote data.

    Either that or you shift the infrastructure to an election commission, high-security datacenter without internet access that runs the actual voting software clients, while the voting machines are actually stupid terminals that reboot between voters and connect to the actual servers via a private network of leased lines.

    Paper trail is essential, regardless of technology. See also my other answer about scrapping computer voting and going to physical coins with an anonymous, random RFID that only the paper receipt can link to the vote.

  • back in the day it was all paper'''''and there were elderly people watching the voting stations call them geeks for the vote and non partisian ////NOW?>>>> trump won with the russians hacking all the individual counties…. and they are going to do more electronic voting machines(bradblog) ….so the russians will will again…trump is bringing democracy down one criminal move at a time

  • Voting in private at an unmonitored location defeats anonymity also, because there is no one to verify you weren't coerced into selling your vote.

  • Physical voting can be compromised if the tallys are intercepted in the middle. So long as another physical vote to confirm isn't done it'll be successful.

  • I'm sure Indian congressis would be jerking off to this video 😂

  • Tom, you really need to look at Indian Electronic Voting Machine. In fact the whole system, there are few things they do differently.

  • How is Russia targeting all 50 states ok well based on that headline they were not successful or that would have been the headline and what does that mean Russia sending out memes on Facebook or just letting people know about some things the clintons have done

  • What would be your view for a mechanical computer for elections? The only way one may be able to tamper with it would be to change the device from with in. I'm talking of computers that may record votes in a manner our mechanical watches changes dates. 🤔

  • replace the word "voting" with "banking" in your video, online banking would start to sound like a bad idea too. Online banking is susceptible to all the same security vulnerabilities as online voting. Yet some how we manage to trust online banking system enough to deposit our hard earn cash into it. I just don't understand why the same online transaction system is so insecure that we cannot trust to record our vote but simultaneously secure enough that we trust it count our money.

  • PLEASE! Make a follow up video describing the theoretically perfect electronic voting system you would design. I would love to see that!

  • It's not around the corner. It's already here. In India.

  • When this video magically gets thousands of downvotes…

  • But but quantum block chain will solve everything.

  • Even without any malware on user devices, if we assume that every single one of the millions of phones and computers has been built from scratch by the person using it – how do you establish trust to all those devices? User accounts and passwords? Everyone with any of the common passwords is vulnerable, and anonymity becomes a huge problem again. PKI (or other asymmetric key sharing systems) just pushes the problem down the road, now you need to establish trust to issue those certificates, plus good luck getting end users to understand TLS client auth.

  • So why should we trust dashlink with our passwords? Sure it encrypts passwords on the client side. However they still control the browser plugin that handles that encryption.

    It would be very easy for them to send out an update that sends the password back to dashlink.

    Why would they do that you ask? Perhaps their own update-server is compromised. Perhaps there is a corrupt employee. Or perhaps they are forced to do so by the FBI or NSA.

    Now if you really want to get paranoid: you also have to trust the browser and the operating system. They too have an update system which is basically a perfect backdoor for the manufacturer of that software.

  • We keep getting people turning up at my local wanting to have the steak and seaweed which was once on some crap TV show. The dog Chalky wouldn't even touch it. That program was aired about twenty years ago. People are both stupid and devious. Chalky wasn't devious. The chef was. Vote whatever you want, just use that vote.

  • Oh, how would the blockchain change electronic voting? Also, soon, contact lenses will play Doom.

  • only the very simple folks who never learn still think they vote.

  • There are lots of other options besides a "personal computer". What about embedded systems? User error, distrust, etc is a lot greater with paper voting. Voting by post can be so much more easily compromised

  • But what if the software is written in haskell.
    Pure, and error free?

  • You can give people a unique anonymous id, they use that id to vote and the machine give them a receipt of their choice and ids.
    At the end of the vote, they can see all the vote and ids, including theirs. So everyone can check that their vote is correctly reported in that sheet.
    The system has to be extremely simple, infrastructure and software. Every computer-guy should understand it.

  • I stopped at …"how can you trust a cksum" …you are just paranoid ….

  • He’s so spot on!!!

  • You can't trust an electronic voting system but you can trust an electronic manager of your most trusted passwords ….bahahahahahha

  • Why would I need a password manager when google stores all my passwords and fills out my forms automatically? That's so much easier than having to rely on an application

  • Its true …. they can't guarantee anonymity if you allow online or electronic voting. There are ways to "try" to make it anonymous, but logs and other information can make it possible to link a single vote to a person. The ONLY time, I've heard that it could be possible is with blockchain…. BUT its still not easy to make it 100% anonymous even with that.

  • I suppose our town in even more vulnerable… since we mark the answers on a paper ballot, then feed it through a machine to record the votes.

  • I guess there is a difference between electronic voting and computer voting? India's voting machines with VVPAT (when that gets fully rolled out) it seems like it would be totally secure.

  • It’s a great idea! Especially when all voting is rigged ! 🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤡🤡🤡🤡🌍🌍🌍🌍🌍

  • I want to go to that room so bad

  • “Malware free and up-to-date”….iPhone X, Jailbroken on iOS 13.2.3 (not the latest!)

  • You don’t need to trust the voting machine nor the central counting server – just de-centralise both of these and problem with trust is solved. This is the problem that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies solved. Anyone can run their own software to cast the vote and anyone can run their own software to check the vote total.

    Your other concerns are valid for this solution though: most people won’t understand a thing and it will be difficult to convince them that this is legit. The malware problem is also still an issue.

    The UK may have a decent physical voting infrastructure that is mostly good enough, but in some countries (like mine), this is not the case and even if the digital voting system may have its flaws, it may still be a better alternative to the corrupted physical system.

  • Granny Farming? You guys are amateurs. In Romania we have Dead Farming.

  • You're obviously more clued in to computer issues than me but you're telling me I can securely manage my entire financial life through internet banking, make and recieve end to end encrypted calls and messages that even governments can't break… yet i cant securely vote?
    I completely understand the risks involved, and i get my internet banking or other important examples are not hack proof but there has to be a system that can securely manage voting…
    On the 'trust' point you raised; there are plenty of methods of building trust in a system you didn't outline.

  • I think There’s a need for a paper to discuss your arguments against my knowledge of this process, by now, to show how I disagree with you and why. For now let’s just say you’re wrong or biased.

  • Democracy is still a bad idea

  • Hi Tom and team (even if I know it's extremely unlikely any of you will ever read this comment).
    Thanks for another great video! I have to say I found the blinking screens in the background highly distracting though.

  • How do you count votes – there are 3 way.
    1. moving machines physically after sealing them. – scott's response – "No one does that".
    Check about voting process of India dude. Tens of thousands of machines voted on by millions of people; are transported in country whose area is bigger than germany, france, spain, portugal, entire UK, norway, sweden, italy, poland combined.

  • I'm not convinced about the importance you've placed on being able to explain to laypeople why they should trust a provably secure electronic voting system. In the UK, companies of all sizes, and the majority of individuals, are already willing to entrust cryptographic systems, that few people understand, with the protection of their most sensitive information. Why would understanding the security of an electronic voting system matter more to people than understanding the security of systems that protect their financial information, their private communications, commercially-sensitive information about the performance and plans of their businesses, their health records, etc.?

  • Tom Scott: Why electronic voting is a bad idea

    "modern" election authorities across world: I am gonna do what's called a pro-gamer move!

  • I don't trust dashlane. I smell hypocrisy Scott.

  • now do one on why voting is a bad idea.

  • A voting machine should not have any connectivity options available (e.g internet, usb, bluetooth, lan etc) and must have a paper trail, so that they can be matched if required. Also each voting machine must give the result without connecting to any server. Later all the results of each voting machine must be summed up by hand as done with paper ballots. All I am saying is that we change the ballot box with voting machines and all the rest of the processes remains same as paper ballot. People must come to a poll booth to cast their vote, but instead of a paper ballot they get a electronic voting machine. How bad is this idea???

  • North Korea:"What is voting??"

  • In Estonia they have electronic voting.

  • But if you do want to try electronic voting, make sure you use NordVPN. Yes NordVPN is a trusted solution that has never had any data brea…oh wait.

  • of course someone got a voting machine to run doom xD

  • I can vote from home or from my phone!!
    … … … In RuneScape … … …

  • Probably most of our PCs are much more secure then gov ones…

  • If I can track a package through Amazon, then I should be able to track my vote. You just give everyone an anonymous code that lets them track their vote digitally from initial entry, through processing to your candidate. If you can't do this, trust won't cut it, so paying folks to tally physical ballots remains imperative…

  • What are your views on EVM used in India? We have been using it for a few decades now without any problem. And, I doesn't have any way to hack

  • Concept: a live show is broadcast leading up to 7am in the morning (including celebrity guests). They all count down excitedly from 10 and shout "START VOTING NOW" as pyrotechnics appear on stage, followed by phone numbers to vote for each party flashing up on the screen, edited together with footage of each party leader.

  • Or you buy nord VPN and your vote is safe, even in public places

  • I know very little about computers so perhaps I am missing something – but it seems to me that most of the objections against electronic voting stem from the anonymity requirement. Perhaps it is worth questioning whether all votes ought to be anonymous. Let me play devil's advocate. J. S. Mill made some very compelling arguments against the secret ballot. The vote, Mill argued, is a public trust: since our vote affects the interests of society, we are accountable to society to vote non-selfishly. If secrecy is indeed not a sacred right but a practical measure to ward off the corrupting influences of bribery and voter-intimidation, then the strength of the case for the secret ballot would depend on the seriousness of those dangers. Naturally, extortion and bribery should be illegal. Mutatis mutandis, the same arguments that make large-scale rigging of paper elections unlikely (the fact that interested parties would be able to discover any conspiracy large enough to affect large-scale electoral outcomes) would seem to make grand schemes of bribery and extortion improbable. The liability of open ballots to corruption would also depend to a great extent on the political culture of society: in a country with relatively lively democratic traditions like the UK, most people would regard selling their vote as tantamount to selling their soul. There is very good evidence for this in the fact that there are already, in fact, quite a number of ways in which people could sell their votes if they were so minded: through postal voting, proxy voting, clandestine selfies in the polling station, idiosyncratic marking of their cross on the ballot, etc. And yet stories of people selling their votes in this way – or even having the idea to do so – are exceedingly rare, if not non-existent. This makes sense even on more cynical grounds: if election rigging of any significant scale is infeasible because it will be found out, there is little advantage to bribing several voters by comparison to the usual democratic methods of persuasion (campaigning, leafleting, canvassing, etc.) which affect more than a tiny handful of votes and which do not carry any risk of being prosecuted. Unfortunately, there is always the possibility, under any practical electoral system, of coercion in a few pathological cases (e.g. abusive and controlling relationships), but it does not seem that this is a problem peculiar to open ballot systems. Further, an open ballot system would have some intrinsic checks on its integrity: people could easily verify that their vote had been counted correctly, and anyone who professed in public such-and-such politics but voted differently might become suspect. In fact, secretiveness about one's real motives for casting one's vote is one of the evils Mill argued was inherent to the secret ballot.

    I do think there is some merit in these arguments. They become more relevant here when we consider some of the potential advantages of electronic voting – that it could allow for greater democratic participation by providing a cheaper, easier and more efficient means of voting. Perhaps we might want to keep the secret ballot for the 'biggest' decisions, whilst extending open ballot electronic voting to allow for greater democratic participation.

  • Now we just need voter ID

  • You'd need to combine few technologies at once: Blockchain + Zero Knowledge Proofs + secure smart cards…

    I don't think people need to understand how it works. Most people don't care anyway (Whether it's physical or digital stuff).

    Anyway, it's not viable any time soon as both Blockchain an Zero Knowledge proofs are very experimental technologies

  • Those are weak reason to support low voter turnout.

  • I can't cite exactly, but there is a quote from Carl Sagan that says that in order for society to function properly, the public must be educated about the scientific method (or something like that, I just can't find the quote). I think this ties nicely with the block chain technology. I still think that we can use it for so many things, include voting. But the fact remains that the general public does not have the slightest clue about how it works. That is kinda sad.

  • Australia: uses web-based Census
    Census: crashes
    Australia: has to remember what they did that they to fill out the Census correctly.

  • I vote for Brexit because the U.K. deserves to be gone.

  • 5:22 And you can ask this human voting tallier to submit to a test to see whether they will tally your test votes accurately, so you know that they aren't changing the votes during an election.

  • What about asymmetric crypto combined with a paper trail? Counting can still be largely similar to paper ballots but would allow for voters to cryptographically verify that their vote was in.

  • I understand your argument against using blockchain is that it's difficult to explain to people, but to be honest I doubt most voters even know how their votes are counted anyway. I've also never been able to implicitly trust paper voting so that doesn't feel like a great argument either. Personally I believe the radical capability for direct democracy that electronic voting can bring us outweighs the difficulty in explaining things like blockchain in a way people can understand and trust.

    That said I really enjoyed this video, very well thought out and presented.

  • Then imagine electronic voting in a dictaorship.

  • Brazil: Am i a joke to you?

  • Go through how voting done in India. We have electronic voting for decates now

  • Democracy is a bad idea

  • Imagine being somebody to whom regular objections are made: "what about Estonia?"
    That's the life.

  • Blockchain- it’s basically a *read only database* 😅😅😅😅

  • The point at 5:08, USA's Electoral College in a nutshell.

  • There is, theoretically, a fourth way to protect votes in transit: a modem, a landline phone connection, and a direct dial to the central counting machine, so yes the ones and zeroes go over the wire, but they never touch the Internet.

    I don't even know where to begin with the problems with this method, but all I'll say is: Nope.

  • What's the difference between 'Hundreds of and Thousands of'

  • Secure connections to a government-controlled virtual desktop, problem solved. No transport needed since everyone is voting on one centralized batch of servers. The hardware itself is located within a facility, and since it'd be government it'd more than likely be guarded as well. ezpz solution.

    (I'm just assuming ballots go to some gov organization, regardless if that's the case or not the concept still applies 😛 )

  • Pertaining to trust concerns, do you think blockchain could work ?

  • congrats brazil!

  • Sounds like blockchain would be the perfect solution.

  • The software would probably be outsourced to the same Indian company that Boeing outsourced the 737 max mcas system to…

  • One of the best endorsements ever! Thanks for being so superb.

  • Sweden is a perfect example why it would be a good idea…
    The people in the voting place sortout the votes they dont like and throw before they ship it to the main office.
    People removing voting pappers from the voting booths.

    The left dont like competition and they will do everything they can and openly brag about it without punishments.

  • I mean, it's not like people trust paper voting, the concept of trust overall makes democracy impossible

  • The biggest drive behind voting machines is large populations, surely? I believe everything you're saying here, but a paper-voting democracy is only really easy if you break it down into very small population constituencies, which goes against the makeup of some federal countries with large populations, like India or the USA.

  • Do it like it's done in your colonial victim, i.e. India. Britain doomed us economically, yet there aren't any election scams post EVM and VVPAT. Learn something, stop being a brat, Britain. Also, provide some reparation, something as simple as a 'sorry' can work too.

  • Ok, boomer

  • They should put in place an electronic vote on whether to use electronic voting, and encourage as many people to tamper with it as possible "100% of voters appear to be against electronic voting"

  • Too bad Keepass will never get its promo segments on YouTube. I would never trust passwords-as-a-service over a simple, verifiable bit of free software that only updates when I ask.

  • Paper voting is still rife with corruption and cheating as well. I guess there is no sure way to stop voter fraud.

  • blockchain?

  • You're going to sit there and mention the UK has legally and illegally identified individual voter ballots and not elaborate on that?

  • something something Wireguard

  • 10:34 just use veracrypt.

  • It's funny, A lot things that you said happened sometimes in Brazil.

  • but doesn't every vote rest on trust?

  • Not to forget those persons who, under the threat of domestic violence, are forced to vote (from home) at the alternative their partner wants (instead of their own preferred alternative).

  • I wouldn't say swaying an election is necessarily that difficult always. In my country results are usually to within a couple dozen votes, even with millions voting.

  • Put it on a blockchain. End of story.

  • No need to change physical votes. Here in the good o' Balkans they just burn a portion of the opposing votes or make them "not up to fill in standard".

  • How about optimizing the process with AI

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